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Abstract 
Incentive contracts can be proposed to a dominant firm that has been excluded from the pollution permit market. We 
determine the optimal characteristics of a contract considering the trade-off between market efficiency and the cost of 
public funds. We show that under incomplete information the firm always buys fewer quotas than under complete 
information. We conclude this study by giving a concrete rule to implement such a contract.
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     1 Introduction
It is widely accepted that pollution permit markets are an e¢ cient mechanism to lead
￿rms to choose the optimal level of pollution reduction (Montgomery 1972). However, if
we assume market power (Hahn 1984), pollution permit markets fail to reach this least
cost solution1 and the total conformity cost is not minimized2. Moreover, the post-trading
equilibrium depends on the initial pollution permit allocation that has been given to the
dominant ￿rm. The regulator can theoretically restore e¢ ciency by giving to this potential
dominant ￿rm3 the number of permits that it needs at the competitive equilibrium (Hahn
1984).
In practice however, the regulator only has partial information regarding the emission
reduction cost for the ￿rms that are being considered within this market. This asymmetric
information between the regulator and the ￿rms prevents the corrective allocation described
above from taking place. Hence, in order to deal with market power, the regulator has to
exclude the dominant ￿rm from the pollution permit market.
So, a "command and control" regulation can be used for the dominant ￿rm, like a pol-
lution standard. But how to ￿x this pollution standard? The optimal pollution standard
cannot be determined because of asymmetric information4. Moreover, reaching in this case
the sub-optimal pollution standard can be very costly for the dominant ￿rm. The "command
and control" approach cannot solve the trade-o⁄between reducing pollution and buying pol-
lution quotas.
Moreover, we ￿nd another limitation to Hahn￿ s proposed approach when we consider the
opportunity for governments to raise non-distortionary revenues from permits. In this case,
taking into account both objectives - social e¢ ciency and permit revenue - Antelo and Bru
(2009) show that the regulator should sell permits to the dominant ￿rm directly, through
bilateral negotiation, and auction o⁄ the remaining permits to the fringe ￿rms. Under this
scenario, the authors ￿nd that the dominant ￿rm buys more permits than what is e¢ cient.
However, they assume complete information, whereas incomplete information is a crucial
issue in environmental regulation.
The purpose of this paper is to suggest an alternative way for dealing with such a domi-
nant ￿rm. Our proposed solution takes into account asymmetric information and the other
assumptions discussed above. We determine the incentive contract that can be designed for
the dominant ￿rm. We show that the ￿rm always buys fewer pollution quotas than with
complete information and that the optimal contract can be implemented by a non-linear
pricing scheme. To characterize this optimal mechanism, we restrict our attention to the
1This question is crucial, because pollution permit markets are the tool most used today to reduce
pollution. We can give, as an example, the European Union Emission Trading Scheme. Moreover, some
market power may emerge on this market since only ten ￿rms receive more than the third of the pollution
cap (Convery et al. 2010).
2The total conformity cost is the sum of emission reduction costs for all regulated ￿rms.
3We call a "dominant ￿rm", a ￿rm which has the capacity to "set" the permit price because it is able to
buy or sell a high quantity of pollution permits relatively to the other ￿rms. This dominant position can be
due to technology or/and initial allocations.
4Under complete information, the "command and control" regulation is e¢ cient. This is challenged under
incomplete information: the regulator sets a pollution standard to the ￿rm but this pollution standard may
not correspond to the e¢ cient level.
1regular case which assumes the hazard rate is monotonic. This condition is veri￿ed by most
usual cumulative distribution functions. It excludes bunching contracts where several ￿rms-
types receive the same price-quantity pair because, in this case, the contract is not revealing
(La⁄ont 1987).
Di⁄erent mechanisms have been designed in an environmental regulation context for
inducing ￿rms to reveal their private information and a literature review is o⁄ered by Montero
(2008). In the best of our knowledge, none of the papers reviewed by Montero considers the
problem we underlined previously. The framework we use is however close to Spulber (1988)
and Mougeot and Schwartz (2008).
This paper is organized as follows. The model and the ￿rst-best allocation are presented
in Section 2. The second-best policy is analyzed in Section 3. In Section 4 we exhibit a
concrete rule to implement the incentive contract and we draw some concluding remarks.
2 Assumptions and the ￿rst-best allocation
We assume that one dominant polluting ￿rm is excluded from a pollution permit market.
The regulator sells non tradeable pollution quotas to this ￿rm so that it reduces its pollution
level, denoted by q. The emission reduction cost is C(q), with Cq < 0 and Cqq > 0: The
￿rm￿ s bene￿t from polluting is given by B(q;a) = ab(q), where b(q) = C(￿ e) ￿ C(￿ e ￿ q), and
￿ e is the steady state level of pollution. Parameter a is speci￿c to the ￿rm. A high parameter
implies that it is very costly to abate pollution. The marginal bene￿t is Bq, and, due to the
properties of C(q), Bq > 0, Bqq < 0, and Baq > 0, which corresponds to the Spence-Mirrlees
condition. If the ￿rm buys q quotas in exchange of a payment t, it has the following revenue:
￿(a;q;t) = ab(q) ￿ t (1)
The damage from pollution is given by the function D( ￿ Q + q), where ￿ Q is the pollution
cap set for the pollution permit market, with Dq > 0; Dqq > 0 and D ￿ Q > 0. Thus, Dq is the
marginal damage induced by the supplementary sale of one permit.
The regulator weights the damage and the bene￿t from pollution with ￿ and (1 ￿ ￿)
respectively. Additionally, we assume that there are some distortionary taxes in this economy.
The regulator has a secondary objective of raising revenue through the allocation of these
pollution quotas, as this enables him to reduce the level of distortionary taxes currently in
place. So we take into account the shadow cost of public funds5 (￿).
In order to determine the ￿rst-best allocation, we assume complete information between
the regulator and the ￿rm. In this partial analysis, the regulator wants to maximize the ￿rm￿ s
pro￿t and the revenue obtained from the quotas￿sale, and to minimize the environmental
damage. Because of the shadow cost of public funds, the monetary transfer between the ￿rm
and the regulator has a social value. Considering the expression of t included in (1), we can
express the social welfare as:
W = (1 + ￿)(ab(q) ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿ ￿ ￿D( ￿ Q + q) (2)
5This assumption implicitly considers that selling quotas is less-distortionary than free distribution. For
a discussion of the literature about the double dividend, see Goulder (1995).
2Maximizing (2) with respect to q leads us to the following expression:
(1 + ￿)abq￿ = ￿Dq￿ (3)
The ￿rm buys a quantity q￿ of quotas such that the weighted marginal bene￿t is equal
to the weighted marginal damage. The overall level of pollution is ￿ Q + q￿. Using the
implicit function theorem shows that the quantity sold to the ￿rm increases with a and ￿
and decreases with ￿ and ￿ Q, revealing several trade-o⁄s. The higher the ￿rm￿ s willingness
to pay for the quota, the more quotas it ￿nally receives. The presence of ￿ and ￿ implies
a trade-o⁄ between both regulator￿ s objectives of clean environment and revenue. If the
shadow cost of public funds is high, the government￿ s revenue objective is signi￿cant and
it sells more quotas to the detriment of environment. This awarding rule also takes into
account the pollution cap decided for the pollution permit market i.e. the trade-o⁄between
marginal bene￿t and marginal damage.




The regulator extracts the ￿rm￿ s willingness to pay for pollution quotas: ￿(q￿;t￿) = 0. Well-
informed about the dominant ￿rm￿ s parameter (a), the regulator is able to implement the
￿rst-best allocation of emission reduction. However, in practice, asymmetric information
prevents the regulator from implementing this ￿rst-best solution and this form of regulation
cannot be e¢ cient.
3 Incentive contract under asymmetric information
We now assume that the parameter a representing the private willingness to pay for
pollution quotas is private information not available to the regulator. If the regulator asks
for a parameter report (^ a) from the ￿rm, we must anticipate that the ￿rm will misreport its
parameter since ￿ = ￿(^ a ￿ a)b(q(^ a)), and ￿ > 0 if ^ a < a. Thus, the previous mechanism
does not hold under incomplete information. We therefore need to characterize the optimal
contract for the sale of pollution quotas under this more realistic assumption.
Assume it is common knowledge that a is the realization of a random variable A, with
probability density function f(￿) > 0 over ￿ = [a￿;a+], and cumulative distribution function
F(￿). To avoid bunching, we make the standard monotonic hazard rate assumption, i.e.
1￿F(a)





two conditions ensure that the mechanism is incentive compatible.
According to the Revelation Principle (Myerson 1979), we are looking for an incentive
compatible mechanism, i.e. a direct revealing mechanism that requires the ￿rm to report
its parameter a. The optimal mechanism is designed by two functions f￿ q(a);￿ t(a)g, which
claim that ￿nal allocation and payment are derived from the reported parameter (^ a). The
regulator o⁄ers the ￿rm a quantity of quotas ￿ q(a) in exchange of a payment ￿ t(a). The ￿rm
chooses the quantity and the payment by announcing ^ a. As the mechanism is incentive
compatible, ^ a = a: the ￿rm chooses to buy the optimal quantity of pollution quotas.
3We note that f￿ q(a);￿ t(a)g are solutions of the welfare maximization program (5) subject
to participation (6), incentive compatibility (7) and possibility constraints (8). Formally, the
government is faced with the following maximization problem:
Maxt(:);q(:)EW = E￿[(1 + ￿)t(a) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿(t;q;a) ￿ ￿D( ￿ Q;q(a))] (5)
subject to:
￿(t;q;a) > 0 8a (6)
with
￿(t;q;a) = ab(q(a)) ￿ t(a)
￿(t;q;a) > ￿(t(^ a);q(^ a);a) 8a;8^ a (7)
i.e.:
ab(q(a)) ￿ t(a) ￿ ab(q(^ a;a)) ￿ t(^ a;a)
q(a) > 0 (8)
Solving this program, we obtain the following conditions characterizing the optimal contract
(see Appendix):
b￿ q(a)[(1 + ￿)a ￿ (￿ + ￿)
(1 ￿ F(a))
f(a)
] = ￿D￿ q(a) (9)




From (9), ￿ q(a) trades o⁄ the weighted marginal damage and the marginal bene￿t corrected
by the "weighted virtual signal" of the ￿rm i.e. [(1 + ￿)a ￿ (￿ + ￿)
(1￿F(a))
f(a) ]. Using the
implicit function theorem, we ￿nd that quantity ￿ q increases with a and6 ￿ and decreases
with ￿ and ￿ Q. As in complete information, there is a con￿ ict between pollution reduction
and raising a revenue, but the solving of this con￿ ict is di⁄erent because it takes into account
incomplete information. Comparing the optimal quantity under complete information (3)
with that obtained under incomplete information (9), we ￿nd the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Under asymmetric information, the dominant ￿rm always purchases fewer
pollution quotas than under complete information.
When a = a+, q￿(a+) = ￿ q(a+). Moreover, the quantity increases with a. As the bracketed
term in (9) is lower under asymmetric information than under complete information, the ￿rm
always buys a lower quantity of pollution quotas than under complete information if a < a+.
Thus, the global pollution cap given by ( ￿ Q+ ￿ q) is lower under asymmetric information than
under complete information.
It is well-known that revealing information is costly. In order to raise a higher revenue,
the regulator sells more pollution quotas if the ￿rm￿ s willingness to pay a is high. However
6We ￿nd
@￿ q
@￿ > 0 if a >
(1￿F(a))
f(a) , which is true under one of our assumptions making sure that the contract




f(a) 8￿;￿. This condition obviously holds if ￿ = 1 and ￿ = 0.
4in order to induce the ￿rm to reveal its true parameter, the regulator grants it a rent. The
￿rm with the lowest parameter (a￿) gets no rent because it has no incentive to lie. On the
contrary, the rent is the highest for the ￿rm with the highest parameter (a+). Since granting
the ￿rm a rent is costly for the regulator, it reduces it by diminishing the quantity sold.
Proposition 1 says that the regulator o⁄ers a fully separating contract. This separating
contract holds because the hazard rate is monotonic. This monotonic assumption is usual in
the incentives literature and is satis￿ed by many cumulative distribution functions (La⁄ont
1987). We also neglect some parameters to obtain this regular solution7. Taking into account




f(a) would also lead to a bunching or pooling contract.
Thus, the ￿rm may choose to buy a non-optimal quantity. In this case, using this kind of
contract to regulate the dominant ￿rm seems questionable8.
4 Implementation of the optimal mechanism and concluding remarks
According to the optimal mechanism, the regulator announces the functions {￿ q(a);￿ t(a)}
to the ￿rm. As the mechanism is incentive compatible, the ￿rm reveals its true parameter.
As usual in economic theory, we seek a way to implement this mechanism. Since ￿ q(a) is
a monotonic increasing function with respect to a, we can de￿ne a global payment, as a
function of the quantity (Goldman et al. 1984). In this case, the regulator lets the ￿rm
choose the quantity to buy. Let us denote ￿(￿ q), the inverse function of ￿ q(a). Replacing in
(10), ￿ t(a) becomes ￿ t(￿ q):





This implementation is an example of a non-linear pricing scheme. In this case, the rent
being allocated to the ￿rm can be seen as a quantity discount. However, implementing this
solution requires the regulator to make sure that pollution quotas are not transferable.
With the presence of a dominant ￿rm in the pollution permit market, one way to restore
e¢ ciency is to give it a number of quotas corresponding to its need at the competitive
equilibrium (Hahn 1984). Another solution is to exclude the ￿rm from the permit market.
In this case, the regulator can use a "command and control" approach to impose an emission
reduction. If raising a revenue is also an objective for the regulator then, according to
Antelo and Bru (2009), a bilateral negotiation between the ￿rm and the regulator can be
used. However, all these forms of regulation need complete information and are ine¢ cient if
we relax that condition and assume incomplete information. An alternative is to implement
an incentive contract to reach the second-best allocation.
According to this incentive contract, the regulator can raise a revenue, which can be used
to achieve the so-called "double dividend". The dominant ￿rm can reduce its emissions at




f(a) ) is not very restrictive because this de￿ned threshold may be inferior to a￿.
8In another context, to analyze whether it is optimal to have bunching, see Weymark (1986).
5low cost, because the incentive contract leads to a trade-o⁄between buying pollution quotas
and reducing emissions. This procedure is not detrimental to environment. The pollution
permit market remains competitive and the total conformity cost is minimized.
In this article, we have considered one dominant ￿rm and several competitive ￿rms act-
ing in a pollution permit market. Note that the incentive contract that we have determined
also applies if there is only one polluting ￿rm in a given geographic area, by ￿xing ￿ Q = 0.
Conversely, this contract is not valid if there are more than one dominant ￿rm. In this case,
there is an interdependence between polluting ￿rms and an auction model has to be used.
Appendix








b(q(s))ds + ￿(t;ai￿) 8a (A2)




fb(q(a))[(1 + ￿)a ￿ (￿ + ￿)
(1 ￿ F(a))
f(a)
] ￿ ￿D( ￿ Q + q(a))gf(a)da ￿ (￿ + ￿)￿(a￿)
Since ￿(￿ + ￿) is always negative, we have ￿(a￿) = 0. Then, (10) is obtained from (A2)
and (6). After rearrangement, the pointwise maximization of EW leads to equation (9).
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